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The Effects of Two Variables, Victim Provocation and Defendant Intox
ication, On Simulated Jurors* Perceptions of Guilt in a Case of WifeBattering (84 pp.)
Director:

Dr. Herman A. Walter

The purpose of the present investigation was to; (a) investigate
the general effect of a hypothetical wife-battering case on simulated
jurors* perceptions of a defendant's guilt, (b) assess the impact of
manipulating two informational variables in the case, victim provo
cation and intoxication of the assaulter, on jurors* verdicts, and
(c) examine the relationship between jurors* perceptions of guilt and
general views of the role of women in society, as estimated by a
short version of the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS).
174 subjects who had previously completed the AWS were selected
from University of Montana psychology classes and randomly assigned
to one,of four experimental conditions. All subjects received a
case summary involving charges stemming from an incident in which a
woman was beaten by her husband. Half of the subjects received
information which indicated the victim had provoked the beating,
while the other subjects received information which indicated she had
not. Likewise, case summaries either indicated that the defendant
was intoxicated at the time of the battering incident, or that he was
sober. Subjects first read the case summaries, then rendered an
individual verdict and made recommendations for sentencing. Next,
subjects were divided into six-person jury groups and asked to ren
der an unanimous group verdict. Finally, subjects completed a brief
questionnaire concerning their perceptions of the victim, the defen
dant, and the case in general.
Results indicated that: (a) when the victim had provoked the batter
ing, female subjects were significantly more likely to find the defen
dant guilty than when the victim did nothing to provoke her attacker,
(b) jurors who were told the defendant was intoxicated were no more
likely to find the defendant innocent than were those jurors who were
told he was sober, and (c) jurors having traditional attitudes toward
the role of women were no more likely to find the defendant not guilty
when his wife provoked the incident than those jurors having more nontraditional attitudes toward the role of women in society.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Recently, the problem of violence within the family, particularly
marital violence, has become a topic of national Interest, with the
appearance of television programs, newspaper and magazine articles,
books, and professional journal articles bespeaking a public awareness
which was nonexistent ten years ago.

As a result, more and more women

who are the victims of marital violence are realizing that this abuse
does not necessarily have to be tolerated and are now bringing assault
charges against their spouses.

Thus, the prosecution of cases Involv

ing "wlfe-batterlng" Is becoming a much more frequent occurrence (Martin,
1976).
However, despite rising public Interest In the plight of the
battered woman, researchers are finding that the majority of people
still hold a number of myths about wife-battering to be true, and that
many Individuals condone the use of physical force within a marital
relationship (Celles, 1972; Stark & McEvoy, 1970).

When one considers,

then, that It Is with just such people that the ultimate decision of
guilt rests for court cases Involving marital violence, this poses some
Important questions.

For Instance, how will the belief that female

battering victims "ask for It", I.e., the myth of provocation, ( Martin,
1976) affect jurors' perceptions of a defendant's guilt?

Likewise,

how will the tendency of many people to view drunkenness as a justifi
cation for the assaulter's loss of control In a battering situation
(Celles, 1972) Influence jurors' decisions?

And more generally, what
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Impact will the tendency to devalue women who are victims of violence
(Lemer & Simmons, 1966; Symonds, 1975) have on jurors* perceptions of
conjugal assault cases?
The majority of the research dealing directly with perceptions of
marital violence has been conducted using interview and case history
procedures (Gayford, 1975; Celles» 1972; Stark & McEvoy, 1970),

How

ever, numerous studies have appeared in the social psychological lit
erature which can be considered to be related to attitudes concerning
marital violence.

Many of these studies have utilized a basic paradigm

originally designed by Buss (1963) which involves having subjects
either shock victims or view victims being shocked.

This analogue

work has contributed a great deal to what is known about situational
determinants of aggressive behavior, including the sex of the aggressor,
as well as the sex and characteristics of the victim (for review, see
Frodi, Macaulay & Thome, 1977).

Similarly, another area of social

psychological research, that of attribution, has produced a variety
of studies which have examined attitudes toward victims of a multitude
of different crimes, accidents, and circumstances (e.g., Jones &
Aronson, 1973; Lerner & Miller, 1978; L e m e r & Simmons, 1966).

Finally,

mock jury research has investigated the effects of a variety of situa
tional variables on jurors* perceptions of a defendant*s guilt in cases
involving the perpetration of violence on a victim (for review, see
Gerbasi, Zuckerman, & Reis, 1977).
However, none of these social psychological studies concerning
attitudes toward aggression and attitudes toward victims appears to
have dealt specifically with the assessment of attitudes toward aggres
sion or violence within a marital relationship.

Likewise, mock jury
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research has not Investigated the effects of situational variables on
perceived guilt of a defendant when his victim is specifically related
to him by marriage.

Clearly, the findings of Celles and others suggest

that the added element of the existence of a marital relationship
between an aggressor and his victim could significantly alter percep
tions and attitudes toward the aggressive behavior.
The basic purpose of the current investigation, then, was three
fold.

First, it attempted to investigate the general effect a hypo

thetical wife-battering case would have on simulated jurors' percep
tions of a defendant's guilt.

Second, it also attempted to assess

the impact of manipulating two situational variables in the case,
namely victim provocation and intoxication of the assaulter, on jurors'
verdicts.

Finally, the relationship between perception of guilt and

general views of the role of women in society, as assessed by a short
version of the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS) (Spence, Helmreich &
Stapp, 1973), was examined.
The following literature review is organized into two parts.
First, research which has dealt directly with attitudes and perceptions
of marital violence via case history and interview methods will be
discussed.

Cultural beliefs and stereotypes concerning wife-battering

will be presented at this time.

Next, investigations of a primarily

social psychological nature, which appear to be related to the general
area of attitudes toward violence and victims will be examined.

Included

will be those studies which have been concerned with aggressive
behavior in a laboratory setting, victim devaluation or derogation,
and simulated jurors' decisions in cases involving violence and a victim.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Cultural Perceptions of Marital Violence

Because of the Increase in professional and public attention
being directed towards the phenomenon of marital violence, it would
almost appear that wife-battering is a new social problem, the fre
quency of which has mushroomed in recent years.

However, statistical

evidence indicates that wife-battering is neither new nor is it dras
tically increasing (Martin, 1976),

A more plausible explanation of

this apparent sudden rise in the phenomenon is that, prior to the
1970’s, marital violence, like child abuse, appears to have been a
taboo subject which was virtually ignored by both the public and social
scientists alike (Celles, 1972; Straus, 1976).
Celles (1972) traces this "selective inattention" to a number of
factors.

One of these seems to be the societal definition of the

family as nonviolent.

The American family is ideally thought by many

to be that entity typified by television's situation-comedies: a
warm, supportive, and peaceful refuge from the harshness of the world
outside.

In fact, states Celles, this happy picture of family life in

America is somewhat of a myth, as he concluded that in many case "a
marriage license also functions as a hitting license" (p. 153).

How

ever, the mistaken belief that husband-wife violence is a relatively
rare type of behavior has led sociologists and psychologists to ignore
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the actual violence occurring frequently in "normal" families.

Thus,

as Steinmetz and Straus (1974) have suggested, the "semisacred" nature
of the family in society seems, in part, to account for the paucity of
research in the area of family violence.

This, however, has been chang

ing in recent years.
Likewise, viewing marital violence as a rare form of individual
psychopathology has allowed the public to perceive wife-battering as
something which only a very few "sick" individuals do.

Numerous authors

(e.g.. Celles, 1976; Gil, 1970; Walker, Note 1) have postulated that
the myth of the wife-beater as "sick" has persisted in the face of
evidence to the contrary because it allows people to think of wifebattering as something only a "psychopath" does; they then do not have
to wonder if they themselves are abusers.

By definition they cannot be,

because they are not "sick".
Similarly, the popular assumption that marital violence is more
likely to occur in ghetto and lower-class families (Martin, 1976) also
reflects the unwillingness of most individuals to face the univer
sality of the problem, again, despite evidence to the contrary.

Bard

(1971), for example, has found that the number of cases involving wife
abuse reported in New York's West Harlem, a community of working-class
Blacks and Chicanos, was approximately the same as that reported during
the same period in Norwalk, Connecticut, a white, upper-middle-class
community with the same size population.
However, there are some societal expectations with respect to
violence in the family which appear to conflict with this ideal that
violence does not occur in "normal" families.

On the one hand, the
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family is characterized as gentle, peaceful and harmonious, while on
the other hand, there are some societal norms which legitimize, and
even encourage, the use of physical force within the family— as in the
disciplining and training of children.

The old maxim "spare the rod

and spoil the child", suggests Celles (1976), is indicative of cultural
norms concerning force and physical violence toward children.

In the

case of husband-wife violence. Stark and McEvoy (1970), in their
analysis of data provided by the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence, found that nearly one-fourth of all Americans
polled admitted to approving of hitting one's spouse on certain,
appropriate occasions.

P a m a s (1967), in his work as a police officer

intervening in domestic disputes, discovered that there were some
occasions when wives felt that it was acceptable for a husband to
beat his wife.

In short, some violence in marital and family interac

tions is considered by some to be normal, routine, and even necessary.
According to Celles (1972), from the point of view of the offender,
normal violence is "normal" because it is used to achieve some positive
goal.

Likewise, the victim also believes that the physical force used

was necessary and acceptable, because he or she either benefitted from
it or deserved it.
It should be clear at this point that although in the past
society has, to a certain extent, denied the existence of marital and
family violence in a fairly large proportion of the population, there
are still cultural norms which appear to legitimize violent behavior in
the family, if not normalize it.

Several assumptions and stereotypes

concerning wife-battering appear to have been instrumental in this
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legitimization.

One of these Involves the rather basic assumption

that. In certain situations. It may be beneficial for one Individual
to hit or slap another.

Another stereotype which appears to have

played a part In Justifying spouse abuse Is the picture of a nagging,
shrewish wife who "asks for It" by verbally abusing her long-suffer
ing husband until he assaults her.

Finally, the tendency on the part

of many people to view Intoxication as a justification for loss of con
trol, has also played a part In excusing the behavior of an Individual
who harms his wife while In an Intoxicated state (e.g., ^'He was drunk—
he didn't know what he was doing").

A more detailed discussion of

each of these points of view follows.
As has been discussed previously, the family Is one of the very
few groups to which society gives a clear right (and sometimes the
obligation) to use physical force and restraint, as, for example. In
the physical punishment of children (Celles, 1976).

Similarly, several

authors have encountered the belief that It may be necessary for a
husband to use violent means, under certain circumstances, with his
wife.
Celles (1972), In his Interviews with over 80 families, discovered
that the belief that husband-wife violence Is acceptable If It achieves
some goal Is not uncommon.

In such circumstances, the husband Is

typically the aggressor and the wife the victim, although Celles has
encountered cases Involving wifely aggression toward the husband.

In

some cases, wives believe that they are struck because they deserve It.
Celles quotes one wife as saying, "I have a habit of not keeping my
mouth shut.

I keep at him and at him, so he finally turns around and
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belts me.

It's usually my fault, I ask for It" (p. 59).

Celles has

also encountered the rather surprising viewpoint that the act of hit
ting often relieves tension and thus prevents the buildup of further
pressure which might result in a more serious assault.

This seems to

clarify somewhat why the wives whom Parnas (1967) interviewed felt
that an occasional beating was not necessarily negative.
Another variety of conjugal violence which is often justified
on the basis that it is beneficial, is that of the husband using
violence to bring his wife "to her senses" (Celles, 1972, p* 61).
Circumstances frequently cited as being appropriate for this type
of violence include an hysterical spouse or an extremely angry one.
Adrian and Mitchell (1978), in their interviews with battered women,
were informed by one woman that she felt that it was entirely
appropriate for her husband to slap her "if she were ever to get out
of hand" (p. 19), meaning whenever she was uncontrollable or deserved
it.

This belief that in certain situations, it is beneficial to hit

or slap another individual may be encountered as well in other than
husband-wife relationships, but it would seem that the application
of such an assumption might particularly lend itself to legitimizing
the occurrence of marital violence under certain circumstances.
The persistent stereotype of the battered wife as a nagging,
shrewish individual who provokes her attacker, has also contributed
to the legitimization of wife abiise.

Celles (1972) comments that this

image has been fostered, in part by stand-up comedians and television
comedies— for example, Ralph Cramden on the old "Honeyrooners" show
threatens "one of these days...pow, right in the kisser" (p. 138).
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Likewise, certain works of literature, for example Shakespeare's
"Taming of the Shrew", also seem to have contributed to this Image.
Until recently, mental health professionals have also done their
share In perpetuating the stereotype of the wife who "asks for It".
Snell, Rosenwald, & Robey (1964), In their article concerning person
ality characteristics of the wife of the wlfebeater, variously describe
such women as castrating, controlling, masochistic, frigid, and unfemlnlne.

Similarly, Goode (1974) argues that marital violence Is typi

cally the product of a "war of words so sharp, with the feeling of
betrayal and loss so great, that redress must be physical and destruc
tive" (p. 38).

He lays the blame for such a "war" on the woman, as

he feels that she Is the one who typically Is the "most competent In
verbal attack" (p. 38).

It Is understandable, then, that the picture

of a man who has been pushed to the limits of his endurance by a taunt
ing wife comes so easily to mind when one hears of wlfe-batterlng.
This Is not to say, as Celles (1972) points out, that there Is
not some grain of truth In this Image.

Wives who have been assaulted

by their spouses often believe that they provoked the attack by nag
ging or being verbally abusive.

Many battered wives state that If

they could have kept silent, the violence never would have occurred.
However, Celles concludes that It Is a fallacy to think that the
wife Is totally to blame.

He reports frequently encountering women

whose apparent nagging had a reason behind It.

One woman was hit In

the face by her husband when she asked him to help her shovel snow;
another said that she had been beaten severely after asking her spouse
for grocery money.

Walker (Note 1) has also concluded that It Is not

10
uncommon for battering incidents to have "no ground in reason" (p. 6),
having counseled women who were awakened from a deep sleep to be
assaulted by their spouses.

Whatever the circumstances, the major

point to be made here is that, legally, nagging or verbal provocation
is not sufficient justification for hitting or beating another person.
However, the myth of victim-precipitated marital violence hangs
on, with attitudes toward abused women bearing a striking resemblance
to attitudes toward rape victims (Pogrebin, 1974).

It is not uncommon,

states Sands (1976), to find those who believe that the battered
woman finds a certain masochistic pleasure in being beaten, just as
some believe the rape victim enjoys violent sex.

Not surprisingly,

these beliefs are often internalized by the victim, such that battered
women will frequently accept total responsibility for the violence
(Adrian & Mitchell, 1978).

Underlying this acceptance, states Celles

(1972), is the assumption by many that anyone can be justifiably provoked
verbally to physical violence, and that verbal abuse is sufficient
justification for hitting another individual.

Implicit, it would also

seem, in this acceptance, is the assumption that one is not as respon
sible for violent actions which have been provoked by intolerable ver
bal abuse.
Finally, the frequent involvement of alcohol in marital violence
has been cited by numerous authors as a means of "disavowing the
deviance" of wife-battering (e.g., Bard & Zacker, 1971; §nell, Rosen
wald, & Robey, 1964).

Celles (1972) found a high association between

violence and alcohol, as did Wolfgang (1957).

One important aspect of

Celles' findings was that alcohol-related violence was almost exclusively
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male violence.

In only one family out of the 80 Interviewed, did a

wife become violent towards her husband while drinking.

In most cases.

Celles found that the wives In these families placed the blame for
their husbands' violence on alcohol; I.e., they believed alcohol had
caused their husbands to act violently and excused somewhat their
behavior.

Bard and Zacker (1974) have also noted that there Is a per

sistent tendency on the part of most people to Infer a causal rela
tionship between alcohol and violence.
Lang and his colleagues have postulated that the drinklng-aggresslon
relationship Is mediated by certain expectancies concerning the
effects of alcohol consumption and by a tendency of many people to
attribute antl-soclal acts to their Intoxicated state (Lang, Goeckner,
Adesso & Marlatt, 1975).

Along these same lines, Sobell and Sobell

(1973) have pointed out that one of the rewards of heavy drinking Is
that It provides a socially acceptable excuse for engaging In other
wise unacceptable behaviors. Including violence, with a minimum of
social disapproval.
Celles (1972) feels that drunkenness serves two Important functions
In marital or family violence.

First, drinking can act as a means of

neutralizing or "disavowing the deviance" (p. 114) of hitting a family
member.

Thus, the assaulter will often explain that he was Intoxi

cated at the time the Incident occurred and was not totally respon
sible for his behavior.

The family and others will then agree that

alcohol caused the Individual to lose control of his behavior.

There

fore, whatever has happened Is not really the assaulter's fault.
Second, because of the common assumption that alcohol may cause Inappro
priate behavior, the drinker can utilize the period when he Is drunk
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as a "time out" (p. 116) from the norms of everyday life.

According

to Celles, the Individual, once sober, can then deny knowledge of the
violent behavior ("I don't remember, I was drunk"), apologize ("I didn't
know what I was doing"), or excuse the behavior ("I never would have
done It If I had been sober"), and stand a good chance of having his
denial, apology, or excuses accepted by both his wife and others.
Thus, attests Martin (1976), by pleading Intoxication, the assaulter,
his victim, and others can admit that violence has occurred, but also
maintain that alcohol was responsible for that violence.

Apparently,

In our society, notes Martin, violent actions become more understandable
and excusable when they happen to be performed by someone who Is Intox
icated.

There Is even some rather controversial legal support for

this view. In the form of the "diminished capacity doctrine".

This

doctrine reduces the degree of homicide to second degree murder or
voluntary manslaughter when the offender Is proved to have been Intox
icated (Kiser, 1944).

However, according to Adrian and Mitchell (1978),

In the case of aggravated or misdemeanor assault, being voluntarily Intox
icated or drugged Is not a sufficient legal defense.

In short. It can

be seen that the tendency of many to view drunkenness as a justifica
tion for loss of control In a battering situation also plays an Impor
tant part In normalizing somewhat the phenomenon of wife abuse.
In summary. It can be seen that some common stereotypes or assump
tions concerning wlfe-batterlng, particularly the myth of provocation
and the view of Intoxication as a justification for loss of control,
have been Instrumental In legitimizing this type of violence.

Clearly,

as was noted at the outset, the existence of these cultural beliefs
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raises some important questions concerning the effects these beliefs
or stereotypes may have on jurors* perceptions of wife-battering
cases.

Aggressive Behavior and Attitudes toward Victims:

Experimental Evidence

The following portion of this literature review will survey those
experimental investigations which have appeared primarily in the social
psychological literature and seem to be related to the perception of
marital violence.

Examination of these studies will be organized

into three parts.

First, research which has dealt with aggressive

behavior, via analogue techniques, will be discussed.

Next, litera

ture concerning victim derogation and the attribution of responsibil
ity for various crimes, incidents and circumstances will be covered.
Last, simulated jury research which has examined jurors' perceptions
of guilt in cases involving violence and victims will be reviewed.
Also, since a simulated jury will be utilized in the present investi
gation, the methodology of simulated jury studies will be critiqued.

Attitudes toward Aggression

Although this portion of the literature has been entitled
"Attitudes toward Aggression", it should be noted that the majority
of the studies to be examined here actually utilized paradigms which
investigated the willingness of subjects to be overtly aggressive
(physically or verbally) in a variety of situations.

However, for

the purposes of this review, these studies on aggression have been
included, as it is hoped they may shed some light on general attitudes
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toward aggression, especially when females are the victims of the
aggressive behavior.
As was mentioned earlier, many of the aggression studies have
utilized a paradigm originally designed by Buss (1963).

In the Buss

procedure, the experiment is presented to the subjects as being an
investigation of the effects of punishment (i.e., shock) on verbal
learning.

The experimenter’s confederate, who is posing as a subject,

is then chosen to be the "learner", while the real subject acts as
the "teacher", shocking the learner each time he or she fails to per
form the learning task correctly.

Intensity of the shock delivered

is defined as the measure of a subject's aggressiveness toward the
victim.

A few other studies have used procedures other than the Buss

paradigm.

Most notable are those investigations which have utilized

nonhurtful foam bats (Young, Beier, Beier, & Barton, 1975), hornhonking (Deaux, 1971; Unger, Raymond, & Levine, 1974), and the Milgram
(1974) paradigm (Niedorf, 1970) in the examination of aggressive
behavior.

Such analogues of aggressive behavior are not of course

directly transferable to behavior in non-laboratory situations.

How

ever, it seems reasonable to assume that the findings of such analogue
studies can, as stated above, give some useful clues to attitudes
toward aggressive behavior and the victims thereof.
Frodi,

(1977), in their review of the experimental lit

erature on adult female and male aggression, found that the majority
of studies demonstrated that both men and women behave less aggress
ively toward women than toward men (Buss, 1966; Taylor & Epstein,
1967; Taylor & Smith, 1974).

Additionally, Buss and his colleagues
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discovered that aggression toward female victims aroused more guilt
and opposition to using shock in both males and females (Brock &
Buss, 1962, 1964; Buss, 1963; Buss & Brock, 1963).
On the other hand, Frdoi, ejt

(1977) reviewed four studies

which showed no differences in aggression toward male and female
victims Cbarson, Coleman, Forbes & Johnsom, 1972; Levitt & Viney,
1973; Silverman, 1971; Lando, Johnson-Payne, Gilbert, & Deutsch, Note
2), and three studies which showed that an opposite-sex victim is
more likely to be aggressed against than a same-sex victim (Deaux,
1971; Jaffe, Malamuth, Feingold, & Feshbach, 1974; Titley & Viney,
1969).
In one study using a variation of the Buss paradigm, Taylor
and Epstein (1967) demonstrated that initial differences in aggression
toward male and female victims seemed to disappear when male and fe
male subjects were confronted with an increasingly aggressive oppo
site-sex partner (confederate), who continued to increase the intesity of the shock which the subject received for losing in a competi
tive task.

Thus, in return, both male and female subjects increased

the intensity of shock which male and female partners received, when
given the chance to retaliate.

The authors suggest that these re

sults may reflect a reaction to "violation of social expectation"
(p. 484), whereby male and female subjects felt they were excused
from the usual sex role requirements, when the opposite-sex partner
appeared to be aggressing toward them without justification.
In a similar vein. Young, e_t a]^. (1975) also found that male
subjects who felt that their social expectations of women had been
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violated excused themselves from the usual requirement that they not
be aggressive toward women.

Men, whom it had been assessed believed

that women should take a traditional role in society, increased
their aggressive behavior toward a female partner when she behaved
aggressively toward them.

On the other hand, men who were not opposed

to women taking non-traditional roles showed relatively high aggression
both before and after their female partner behaved aggressively toward
them.
Kaleta and Buss (Note 3), in a study which seems to support
the findings of Young, et al. (1975), also found that a failure to
meet societal norms caused female victims to be shocked more severely.
In this study, the female victim varied her behavior and her appearance
such that she appeared more or less feminine in a number of conditions.
Results indicated that women who were feminine in both behavior and
appearance received the lowest shock intensities, while women who
were unfeminine in behavior and appearance received the highest shock.
The authors concluded that although our society has norms which say
not to harm women, if the woman chooses to forsake the feminine role
(e.g., by acting assertively or aggressively), her aggressor may also
forsake his normative beliefs.
It might be concluded from the above data, then, that highly
aggressive behavior directed at women is not entirely approved of
by either men or women.

However, the results of the Taylor and

Epstein (1967) study, as well as the findings of Young, et al. (1975)
and Kaleta and Buss (Note 3), suggest that this may only be so as
long as the female victim fulfills certain sex role expectations.
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It might be hypothesized, then* that in the case of a wife-battering
situation, observers might be less disapproving of male aggression
toward a female, if she has violated sex role expectations by act
ing aggressively, either verbally or physically, prior to the inci
dent.
In terms of empathy for the victims of aggressive behavior, Buss
(1966) found that female subjects expressed more concern for a victim
(male or female) who claimed to have been hurt by the shock proced
ure than the male subjects did.

Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) presented

similar results which indicated that women are generally more empathie
than men towards shock victims.
In a study by Titley and Viney (1969), in which subjects were
informed that their shock victims were either disabled or nondisabled
it was discovered that women set much lower shock Intensities for
disabled victims than for nondisabled victims, while men did not.
The authors felt that these results offered support for Buss' findings
that women tend to be more empathie toward victims of aggression.
These results were later replicated by Levitt and Viney (1973).
Similarly, two other studies (Milgram, 1974; Niedorf, 1970),
both using the Milgram paradigm, found that women were more upset
than men by the experimental situation, in ways that reflected empathy
for the victim.

The Milgram, paradigm, it should be noted, is very

much like the procedure employed by Buss (1963), although it requires
subjects to set ever increasing shock intensities for the victim and
involved having the experimenter remain with the subjects to urge
them to do so.
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In summary, the bulk of the aggression literature concerned
with empathy seems to support Buss' (1966) early work, which suggested
that sex differences do exist in terms of empathy for a victim of
induced shock.

These findings are not inconsistent with those of

several other studies which have indicated that women experience
significantly more guilt and anxiety in a shock situation than men
did, especially when the victim is female (Brock & Buss, 1962, 1964;
Buss & Brock, 1963).
The aggression literature as a whole, then, though not directly
related to how people may perceive marital violence, appears to give
some clues to how observers perceive aggression toward a female.

It

would appear that, in general, both men and women do not entirely
approve of highly aggressive behavior toward a female victim, and that
women appear to express more concern and empathy for a victim than
men do.

However, as Taylor and Epstein's (1967) work suggests, these

generalities may only stand as long as the victim does not violate
sex role expectations, and does not appear to "deserve" the aggressive
behavior.

Thus, it might be expected that perceptions of marital

violence might be influenced by what appears to be a violation of
social expectations, on the part of the woman, whereby the observer
may feel that retaliation is justifiable if the woman has acted aggre
ssively , either physically or verbally.

This supposition, based on

the experimental evidence, is not, as we have seen, vastly different
from what actually appears to be the case, according to Celles (1972)
and others.

19
Victim Derogation and Attribution of Responsibility

Symonds (1975) and others (e.g., Pogrebin, 1974; Sands, 1976)
have commented at length on the tendency of most people to be reluc
tant or resistant to believing In the Innocence of the victims of
violent crimes— particularly victims of rape and marital violence.
This reluctance, attests Symonds, can be seen In community responses,
police behavior, the family's reactions to the victims, and. Interest
ingly, by the victims themselves.
Experimental Investigations In the area of social psychology
have resulted In the development by L e m e r and his associates (Lerner,
1970; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) of a construct which explains to a cer
tain extent this phenomenon of victim devaluation, and the concomi
tant attribution of responsibility for the crime to the victim.

Known

as "belief In a just world", this construct refers to the tendency of
most people to believe that they live In a just world where people
get what they deserve and deserve what they get.

Belief In a just

world was used by Lerner to explain the fact that, under certain
circumstances. Innocent victims are blamed for their misfortunes.
His reasoning was that derogating the victim helps the observer main
tain his belief that the world Is just, because he can see the victim
as deserving his or her fate. Deservedness, according to L e m e r , con
sists of two components:

personal worth and behavior.

Thus, observers

of a violent crime may either conclude that the victim Is an undesIreable person with undesIreable traits and "deserved it anyhow" (e.g.,
Lincoln & Levlnger, 1972) or that the victim, though desIreable, was
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partially responsible for what has happened because of his or her
behavior (e.g., Chaikin & Darley, 1973).
At any rate, although they will not be reviewed here, numerous
studies have appeared in the literature which seem to confirm Lerner's
"just world" explanation of the tendency to derogate victims (see
Lerner & Miller, 1978 for review).

Also, several investigators (e.g.,

Jones & Aronson, 1973) have demonstrated that this tendency does have
a tremendous impact on the outcomes of simulated jury trials.

This

research will be discussed in more detail in the following section of
this review.
Such research definitely sheds some light on why many individuals
continue to hold as true a number of beliefs about victims of marital
violence, as well as victims of rape.

As Symonds (1975) has postulated,

these beliefs seem to fill the basic need of all individuals to find
a rational explanation for violence:

"Exposure to senseless,

irrational behavior upsets everyone and makes them feel confused, vul
nerable, and helpless.

It is tremendously relieving to believe that

the victim has somehow done something that plausibly contributed to
the crime of violence..." (p. 92).

Apparently, then, believing that

the victim of marital violence "deserved it" or that her aggressor was
not responsible for what he did, due to intoxication, may fulfill the
need to understand why such violence occurred in the first place. Un
fortunately, this need to believe in a "just world" is often fulfilled
at the expense of the victim of wife-battering.

As one battered woman

interviewed by Adrian and Mitchell (1978) stated, "I don't know how
to get across this shame that is connected with being a battered wife.
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The people, the public, always assume you deserve it.,.'* (p. 10),
In conclusion, Lerner*s construct of "belief in a just world"
seems to explain somewhat the tendency of many individuals to devalue
victims in general and attribute responsibility to them for what has
happened.

Also, as has already been mentioned, it would seem likely

that such a construct would have a great deal of impact on jurors* per
ceptions of conjugal assault cases.

Simulated Jury Research

In recent years social psychologists have begun to turn their
attention to examining experimental analogues to the judicial system
in order to discover whether jurors use extra-evidential devices in
arriving at decisions regarding responsibility and degree of punishment
for illegal actions.

Gerbasi, Zuckerman, and Reis (1977), in their

review of simulated jury research, found that a number of extralegal
factors appear to contribute to simulated jurors* verdicts, including
the characteristics of the jurors, and the characteristics of the vic
tim and defendant.
In cases which have been concerned with crimes Involving a vic
tim, it has been noted by Gerbasi, ejt ad. (1977) that Lemer's (1970)
personality construct of *'belief in a just world" often results in the
attribution of fault for a crime to the victim by simulated jurors.
For example, Jones and Aronson (1973) found that less severe prison
sentences were recommended by simulated jurors for the defendant in a
rape case, and greater attribution of fault for the crime was made to
the character of the victim, when the victim was a divorcee (less
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respectable) than when the victim was married or a virgin (most respec
table).

Apparently, suggested the authors, the jurors were more com

fortable devaluing a less respectable victim and were thus able to
attribute more responsibility for the crime to her.
In a similar study, Zuckerman and Gerbasi (Note 4) presented to
subjects an account of a rape, along with the Just World Scale (JWS)
(Rubin & Peplau, 1973).

It was found that subjects with high scores

on the JWS (high belief in a just world) assigned more responsibility
to the rape victim than did low JWS subjects.

These results appear to

support L e m e r ’s (1970) reasoning that people may ^old a victim of
violence responsible for his or her fate in order to preserve their
belief in a just world.
Other investigators have discovered that devaluation of the victim
is not the only way jurors maintain their belief in a just world.
They may also attempt to restore justice by demanding harsher punish
ment for the defendant.

Rubin and Peplau (1975) reported that sub

jects with a high belief in a just world assigned stiffer sentences
than did subjects with a low belief in a just world.

Gerbasi and

Zuckerman (Note 5) have also found that high JWS subjects give more
severe sentences.
Several studies have also attempted to gather information about
the relationship between characteristics of defendants and victims
and trial outcomes.

Briefly, it has been found that mock jurors tend

to give more severe sentences to defendants who harm high status vic
tims (Landy & Aronson, 1969), that defendants with positive charac
teristics are treated more leniently than those who are negatively
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described (Dowdle, Gillen, & Miller, 1974), and that mock jurors
tend to give less severe sentences to defendants whom they perceive
to be similar to themselves (Gerbasi & Zuckerman, Note 5),
In summary, it can be seen that certain extra-evidential factors
do indeed play a role in simulated jurors' verdicts.

Those studies

concerning factors which appear to be relevant to this literature
review seem to indicate that jurors' decisions may be influenced by
the individual juror's personality traits (e.g., "belief in a just
world"), as well as by the characteristics of the defendant and vic
tim.

Although mock jury research has been concerned with crimes

which involved rape (Jones & Aronson, 1973), murder (Landy & Aronson,
1969), and assault (Austin, Walster & Utne, 1976), in all cases, the
victim of these crimes was unknown to the defendant prior to the vio
lent incident.

Clearly, the literature discussed earlier concerning

beliefs about marital violence indicates that many people feel that
the existence of a marital relationship between two people changes
somewhat the norms governing the use of violence. Additionally,
stereotypes of what battered wives are like, as well as assumptions
about responsibility and self-control, appear to color to a certain
extent observers' perceptions of the rightness or wrongness of
violence within a marriage.

Given these sociological findings,

coupled with the experimental evidence already discussed, it seems
likely that mock jurors' decisions in a wife-battering case would be
based on more than just the evidence provided and the law as it stands
concerning assault.

24
Simulated Jury Research Methodology

As has been noted already, Interest in research concerning juris
prudence has been increasing in the last few years.

Recently, Roberts

and his colleagues have pointed out that as the results of this type
of research are used more frequently by the judicial system, it becomes
more and more important that these results have as much validity as
possible (Roberts, Hoffman, & Johnson, 1978).

Although some inves

tigators have attempted to insure this validity by studying actual
juries in the process of decision-making (e.g., Reed, 1965), Gerbasi,
et all (1977) have noted that a number of problems existent in the
majority of jury studies, most of which are analogues, make it diffi
cult to generalize laboratory findings to non-laboratory situations.
Foremost among these problems is the fact that the majority of
trial outcome studies have been based on individual mock juror's
decisions; that is, in almost none of the studies reviewed by Gerbasi,
et al. did the simulated jurors participate in a deliberation process.
There is a great deal of evidence from the field of social psychology
supporting the notion that individuals in groups behave differently from
individuals alone (e.g., Asch, 1953; Kogan & Wallach, 1964), and,
recently a number of investigators have been examining the effects of
group deliberation on trial outcomes.

In a study by Izzett and Leginski

(1974) where the status of the defendant was varied, it was found
that after group deliberation, individual jurors recommended more lenient
prison terms for the low status defendant.

Although the deliberation

procedure produced a significant change in the direction of leniency
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for the low status defendant, it did not produce any changes in the
sentencing of the high status defendant.

More recently, Roberts,

et al. (1978) also found that jurors were more lenient after delib
erating as a group.

Finally, Myers and Kaplan (1976), in an inves

tigation where simulated jurors read high- and low-guilt cases, found
that group deliberation served to polarize the judgements of guilt
and the severity of the prison sentence recommended by the jurors.
Clearly, the findings of these three studies point to the methodo
logical importance of group discussion in the execution of mock jury
studies, especially when some degree of generalizability to the actual
courtroom is the desired goal.
Gerbasi, et al. have also noted that generalization from labor
atory findings is often made difficult by the fact that mock jurors
know that their decisions will have no consequences.

Recent studies

by Kerr, Nerenz, & Herrick (Note 6) and by Diamond and Zeisel (1974)
have attempted to explore this problem.

Kerr, eit al. compared the

decisions of six-person simulated juries and six-person actual juries
in a case concerning the discipline of a college student.

No signifi

cant differences were found between the predeliberation verdicts of the
mock and real jurors.

Likewise, the group verdicts of the mock and

real jurors did not differ.

Unfortunately, the authors point out

that the "real" jurors in this particular investigation knew that their
verdict alone would not decide the student’s fate, as school authori
ties would also be involved in passing judgement on the student.

This,

said the authors, could have allowed ample opportunity for diffusion
of responsibility and the general feeling, on the part of the "real"
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jurors, that their vote was of no real consequence.
Along similar lines. Diamond and Zeisel (1974) compared the ver
dicts of three different types of juries for 10 different actual
court trials.

The first type of jury was the actual one, chosen by

the attorneys, while the second type of jury was made up of potential
jurors who had been rejected by one or the other attorney, and the
third type was composed of individuals chosen at random.

Only half

of the real juries returned guilty verdicts for the 10 trials, whereas
all 10 of the randomly chosen juries and 8 of the 10 juries composed
of rejected jurors voted guilty.

Diamond and Zeisel suggest that be

cause the two juries were made up of random and rejected jurors who
knew that their verdicts would not determine the outcomes of the trials
they apparently assumed different standards of reasonable doubt as
far as the evidence in the trial was concerned.
Gerbasi, ^

al. conclude from the data of the above two studies

that although a number of questions remain concerning the generaliza
bility of jury research, some degree of generalizability seems
"cautiously appropriate" (p. 343),

They further suggest that the

"mundane realism" of jury research be increased in the future, although
no suggestions were made as to how this might be accomplished.

Cer

tainly, the entire area of the problem of generalizability of simu
lated jury research is a fruitful one for further research, as Gerbasi,
et al, have noted.
Other specific aspects of jury research methodology, including
the size of juries, the types of decision rules used, and evidence
presentation, have also been reviewed by Gerbasi, et al. Briefly,
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their review of the pertinent literature suggests that, in terms of
number of jurors, when the incriminating evidence is weak, the ver
dicts of 6- and 12-person juries tend to be equal.

However, when the

evidence is strong, it is to the defendant's advantage to have a
12-person jury, as this maximizes the probability that more than one
of its members will think the defendant is not guilty and hold out for
a hung jury (see Valenti & Downing, 1975),
In terms of the types of decision rules (i.e., the type of agree
ment necessary for a verdict to be valid), only one study has exam
ined the effects of manipulating the assigned decision rule (unanimous
or majority rule).

Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, and Davis (1975),

in a study where subjects were given evidence in a rape case that was
designed to maximize juror disagreement, found that majority rule
juries took less time and fewer polls to reach their verdict.
deliberating under a decision rule of unanimity, on
were much more likely to be hung.

Juries

the other hand,

It can be seen that since such fac

tors as the number of jurors and the type of decision rule have such
a significant effect on mock trial outcomes, the need for standardiza
tion in future simulated jury research is great.
Finally, the matter of presentation of evidence in mock jury
studies, including the order of presentation of evidence (prosecution
and defense) and the number of defense and prosecution arguments, has
also been examined by a number of investigators.

Stone (1969), in a

study investigating the importance of order of case arguments, found
that order of presentation did not affect the final verdicts.

However,

more recently. Walker, Thibaut, and Andreoli (1972) found that the
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party that presented second had a greater effect on the jury than the
party that presented first, regardless of whether It was the defense
or the prosecution.

The authors concluded that the present system,

in which the prosecution presents first and the defense second, is
most fair to the defense, as it gives the defendant the greatest
opportunity to be found not guilty.

Results of another study done

by Thibaut, Walker, and Lind (1972) also indicate that evidence pre
sented second has a stronger effect on mock jurors* verdicts.
The relationship between the number of defense and prosecution
arguments and mock jurors’ perception of guilt has been examined by
Calder, Insko, and Yandell (1974), in a series of studies.

Their

findings supported the hypothesis that perception of guilt would be
related to the number of defense and prosecution arguments put forth.
That is, it was found that jurors who had read one defense argument
and four prosecution arguments were more likely to find the defendant
guilty than were jurors who read four defense arguments and one prose
cution argument.

Summarizing these findings, Gerbasi, ej^ al. state

that since the order and number of defense and prosecution arguments
seem to be important factors in trial outcome, these factors should be
considered more frequently in the interpretation of simulated jury find
ings, as well as in the design of future studies.

Once again, greater

standardization appears to be necessary with regard to such factors.
In conclusion, it appears that although analogues of jury pro
cesses have yielded a great deal of important information, methodo
logical problems have made it difficult to compare various studies
and generalize laboratory findings to actual juries.

Gerbasi, ^

al.
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and other workers in the field of jury research have made a number
of suggestions concerning the importance of group deliberation and
standardization in such research.

Hopefully these suggestions will

come to be applied in future research in this area.
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CHAPTER III
HYPOTHESES

The present investigation was designed to explore the effect
that evidence from a hypothetical conjugal assault case would have
on mock jurors’ perceptions of a defendant’s guilt.

It also attempted

to assess the impact of two situational variables, victim provocation
and intoxication of the assaulter, on jurors’ verdicts and recommen
dations for sentencing.

Finally, the current study was also designed

to examine the relationship between jurors’ perceptions of guilt and
general views of the role of women in society.

Hypothesis One
Given the findings of both sociological and social psychological
research concerning attitudes toward female victims, particularly
victims of wife abuse, it was hypothesized that when the evidence pre
sented to simulated jurors indicated the victim may have provoked her
assaulter prior to the incident (Conditions I and III), jurors would
have a greater tendency to perceive the defendant as not guilty than
when there was no indication of victim provocation (Conditions II and
IV). Both pre-deliberation or individual verdicts and post-deliberation or group verdicts were examined, since there was evidence that
the two might differ.
Hypothesis Two
As with the first hypothesisi on the basis of the literature review
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it was hypothesized that when the evidence indicated victim provocation,
individual mock jurors, if they found the defendant guilty on the pre
deliberation questionnaires, would tend to recommend more lenient
prison terms for the defendant than when there was no evidence of vic
tim provocation.

Recommended prison sentences were measured in months

and years of actual imprisonment.
Hypothesis Three
Again, since previous research provides some support for the notion
that people tend to assume that alcoholic intoxication excuses a
loss in self-control, it was hypothesized that jurors would be more
likely to perceive a defendant as not guilty when there was evidence
that he was intoxicated prior to the assault (Conditions I and II) ,
than when there was evidence that he was not (Conditions III and IV).
Again, both pre-deliberation and post-deliberation verdicts were examined.
Hypothesis Four
Likewise, it was hypothesized that individual jurors, if they
found the defendant guilty on the pre-deliberation questionnaires,
would tend to recommend more lenient prison sentences when there was
evidence that the defendant was intoxicated than when there was evi
dence that he was not.
Hypothesis Five
Since previous research suggests that individuals with tradi
tional views of the role of women in society are more likely to react
negatively to women who do not fulfill sex role expectations (e.g., by
acting aggressively), it was hypothesized that individual juors with
traditional views of women, when presented with evidence that the
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female victim of the battering may have acted aggressively prior to
the battering incident, would be less likely to find the defendant
guilty on the pre-deliberation questionnaires than jurors with nontraditional views.

No other hypotheses were made concerning the rela

tionship of individual verdicts to views of the role of women, due
to the exploratory nature of the present investigation.
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CHAPTER IV
METHOD

Subjects
174 subjects (85 males, 89 females) were selected from Univer
sity of Montana introductory and developmental psychology classes.
All had previously completed a short, 25-item version of the Attitudes
toward Women Scale (AWS, see Appendix A) (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp,
1973).

These students were contacted by phone and asked to participate

in a study concerning judicial processes.

Prospective subjects

were further informed that they would receive experimental credit for
their participation in the study.

Each individual who agreed to par

ticipate in the study was then randomly assigned to one of four exper
imental conditions, with the constraint that at least 36 subjects (18
males, 18 females) were assigned to each experimental condition.

Experimental Design
The design of the present investigation is depicted in Table 1.
The experimental conditions represent a 2X2 factorial design, with
victim information (Provocation vs. No Provocation), and defendant
information (Intoxication vs. No Intoxication), serving as betweensubject variables.

More specifically, all subjects received a court

case summary involving charges stemming from an alleged incident in
which a woman was beaten by her husband.

However, half of the sub-
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Experimental
Conditions

N

Provocation

No Provocation

Intoxication

96

I
n=45
(21 maies,
24 females)

II
n=41
(21 maies,
20 females)

No Intoxication

88

III
n=43
(20 maies,
23 females)

IV
n=45
(23 maies,
22 females)

88

86

Total

174

TABLE 1
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
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jects received information in the summary which indicated that the
victim had been verbally abusive to her husband and slapped him prior
to the beating (Provocation), while the other subjects received infor
mation which indicated that the victim did nothing to provoke the
battering incident (No Provocation).

Likewise, case summaries either

indicated that the husband (defendant) was intoxicated at the time the
battering incident took place, or that he was sober.
imental conditions, then, included:

1)

The four exper

Provocation-Intoxication, 2)

Provocation-Intoxication, 3)

Provocation-No Intoxication, and 4)

Provocation-No Intoxication.

As noted earlier, a balanced number of

No

No

males and females were assigned to each of the four conditions.

Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental
conditions at the time of initial contact.

Each of the four experi

mental conditions was then administered once on each of three consecu
tive days at the Clinical Psychology Center at the University of Montana
(12 sessions total), with 12 subjects minimum (six males, six females)
assigned to each of the sessions.

Subjects who had been assigned to

different conditions were not mixed; rather, all subjects in each
session received the same case summary information concerning the
incident.
It should be noted here that, in order to ensure that at least a
minimum of 12 subjects arrived for each session, 16 subjects were
asked to participate in each scheduled session.

All subjects who

appeared for the session were allowed to participate in the first half
of the procedure (i.e., they were asked to read the case summary and
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render an individual verdict).

However, at the point in the procedure

where subjects were assigned to six-person juries in order to render
a group verdict, those subjects who exceeded the 12 needed to form two
six-person juries were randomly selected out, debriefed, and dismissed.
The order of administration for the four experimental conditions
was rotated each day, such that on the first day. Condition I was
scheduled to run first. Condition II second. Condition III third, and
Condition IV fourth.

On the second day. Condition II was scheduled

first. Condition III second. Condition IV third, and Condition I fourth,
while on the third day. Condition III was scheduled first. Condition IV
second. Condition I third, and Condition II fourth.

It was intended

that this rotation of the four conditions would control for confounding
effects which could be produced by scheduling each condition at the
same time each day (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
Upon arrival at the session, subjects were assigned a subject
number and given an experimental booklet (see Appendix B) containing
1)

general instructions, 2)

incident, 3)

a description of the alleged battering

a trial summary (prosecution’s case and defense’s case),

4) instructions concerning the laws relevant to the case, and 5)

a brief

questionnaire on which the subjects would record their individual
verdicts.

The description of the battering incident, as well as the

trial summary, were derived from information provided by both the
Missoula Conty Attorney’s Office and Celles’ interviews with battered
wives (1972).
General introductory instructions consisted of the following;
Please read the following description of an incident
and the court proceedings which resulted. You are asked
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to render a verdict on the basis of the evidence presented.
This description includes the main points from an actual
trial. The information which you provide will be used to
help formulate policy for dealing with similar cases, so it
is very important that you imagine yourself to be in a
courtroom situation and assume that you are an actual mem
ber of the jury. PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THE PARTICULARS OF
THIS CASE OR YOUR VERDICT WITH THE OTHER PEOPLE PRESENT
UNTIL YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
The general charges concerning the incident in question were
then presented in a summary brief as follows, with those sentences
in brackets being either left out or included depending on the exper
imental condition;
On the evening of July 18, 1978, Mrs, Carole Jones
. (age 31) states that she was assaulted by her husband,
William Jones (age 32), in the kitchen of their home.
According to Mrs. Jones, her husband arrived home at approx
imately 10:30 PM. (Intoxication Condition: Mrs. Jones
states he appeared to be very drunk at the time.)
(No Intoxication Condition: Mrs. Jones states he did not
appear to have been drinking before coming home.) When
Mrs. Jones asked her husband where he had been that
evening, she says he became very angry, shouted at her, and
began kicking the kitchen furniture. (Provocation Con
dition: At that point, Mrs. Jones says she became very
angry and began shouting back at him and calling him
names, including "lousy b ^ " and "stupid bastard". Then,
when Mr. Jones began kicking the furniture, Mrs. Jones states
that she slapped him on the arm once and told him to
"cut it out".) She asserts that then Mr. Jones struck
her on the left side of the head. When it began to "look
like trouble", Mrs. Jones says she moved towards the phone
with the intent to summon help. Mrs. Jones states her
husband then attempted to take the phone away from her
at that point and struck her several more times on the head
and face with the phone receiver, until she broke away from
him and ran to the neighbors* home next door,
A trial summary of first the prosecution's case and then the
defense's case was presented next.

Each case contained an equal num

ber of arguments, as recommended by Calder, et al.(1974).
secution's case consisted of the following:

The pro
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1)

The prosecution first called Mr. Tom Steck, neighbor
of Mr. and Mrs. Jones to testify. According to Mr.
Steck, on the evening of July 18, 1978, he and his wife
heard a knock at the front door and answered it. They
found Mrs. Jones without her glasses and with blood on
her face and clothes. Mrs. Steck then called 911, the
emergency number.
Looking out the window, Mr. Steck
sawMr. Jones get into his car and leave. Mr. Steck
said he then went with Mrs. Jones to her house and
waited in the driveway for the police.

2)

The prosecution then submitted the report of the investi
gating officer, James Hailey. According to Hailey, when
he arrived at the scene, Mr. Jones had left and Mrs. Jones
was in the house bleeding moderately from the nose. He
stated it looked as though her nose could be broken.
There was also a large bruise on her left temple, and her
left eye was very swollen. There was blood on Mrs. Jones'
shirt, and on the
floor of thekitchen. When asked, Mrs.
Jones said that she wished to sign a complaint, and Officer
Hailey took a written statement from her about the inci
dent,

3)

Hospital records submitted by the prosecution showed
that upon admittance to the emergency room, Mrs. Jones
stated that she had been beaten up by her husband. Her
nose was bleeding and her left eye was swollen shut.
Subsequent examination revealed a broken nose and hemo
rrhaging left eye.

4)

In its closing argument, the prosecution stated that it
had proven its case by presenting the charges made by Mrs.
Jones, the testimony of her neighbor and the investigating
officer, and by submitting hospital records which detailed
the extent of Mrs. Jones' injuries. In addition, the pro
secution noted that it was very unlikely their client con
cocted the beating story so quickly and in so much detail
under the circumstances described.

The defense's case was summarized as follows, with those sentences
in brackets being either left out or included depending on the exper
imental condition:
1)

The defense first called Mr. Jones to testify in his own
behalf. Mr. Jones stated that he had not been angry about
being asked by his wife, Carole, where he had been on the
evening of July IS, 1978, and denied shouting at her and
"kicking furniture around". Instead, he stated that his
wife was extremely upset with him for coming home at such
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a late hour (Provocation Condition; and began being both
verbally and physically abusive of him). He asserted that
she then grabbed the telephone receive and came at him,
as if she was going to strike him with it.
2)

3)

According to Mr, Jones, he then struggled with his wife
in an effort to get the phone out of her hands, so as to
protect himself. He admitted that it was possible that
his wife may have received blows to the head at that time,
but he denied that he ever intentionally struck his wife
or intended to harm her in any way, (intoxication Con
dition: He admitted he had been drinking heavily before
coming home,) (No Intoxication Condition: He stated that
he had not been drinking before coming home,) He further
stated that he had no idea she was hurt badly at the time
and so left the scene in order to allow his wife to "cool
off",
Next, the defense called Dr, H,R, Brown, a local physician,
to the stand. According to Dr, Brown, there was nothing in
the hospital records submitted by the prosecution which
would indicate that Mrs, Jones' injuries were intentionally
caused. He clarified this statement by saying that the
hospital records did not prove, one way or the other,
whether or not the injuries were accidentally or inten
tionally caused,

4) In its closing argument, the defense attested that their
client acted in self-defense during the incident in ques
tion, and in no way intended to harm his wife. Any blows
received by Mrs, Jones, the defense further stated, were
entirely accidental. In addition, the defense felt that
the hospital records submitted by the prosecution did not
rule out the possibility that the pattern of injuries re
ceived by Mrs, Jones could have been accidentally caused.
Next, instructions concerning the laws relevant to the case were
given.

These included the following:

1, You are instructed that a person commits the offense of
assault if he purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury
to another,
2,

You are instructed that the term "bodily injury" means phy
sical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condi
tion and includes mental illness or impairment,

3,

You are instructed that a person is justified in the use of
force or threat to use force against another when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is nec-
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essary to defend himself or another against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified
in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm
to himself or another, or to prevent the commision of a
forcible felony.
Additionally, jurors were given the following final instructions;
After weighing these points, you must decide whether
the evidence has convinced you of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If any such doubt causes a feeling
of hesitation and dissatisfaction in your mind which will
not permit you to rest on a verdict of guilty by the
evidence, then, by law, you are to find the defendant not
guilty.
The law forbids you to be governed by sentiment, sym
pathy, passion, prejudice or public opinion. Both the
State and the defendant have the right to expect that you
will faithfully and fairly consider and weigh the evidence
and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just
verdict, without considering what the consequences or sentence
will be.
Finally, a brief questionnaire was given to the subjects concern
ing the individual subject's verdict, recommended sentencing (if the
subject found the defendant guilty), and confidence in the verdict
rendered :
1)

Now we would like you to indicate your verdict. Please
feel free to review all instructions and information.
As a juror, I find the defendant:

2)

a)

guilty

b)

not guilty

(circle one)

If you voted "guilty" above, what would your recommended
sentence (actual time in jail) be?
a)

Maximum sentence of 5 years

b)

Maximum sentence of 2-3 years

c)

Maximum sentence of 1 year
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3)

d)

Maximum sentence of 8 months

e)

Maximum sentence of 6 months

f)

Maximum sentence of 2 months

g)

Maximum sentence of 30 days or less

How confident are you of your verdict?

(circle one)

a)

Extremely confident of verdict

b)

Strongly confident of verdict

c)

Moderately confident

d)

Slightly confident

e)

Unsure of verdict

After distribution of the booklets, the experimental assistant
stated that the purpose of the study was "to study the manner in which
people judge various crimes".

It should be noted that the experi

mental assistant was always blind to the conditions which were being
administered.

The experimental assistant then instructed the subjects

to read the booklets carefully, while she read the instructions aloud
to them.

After reading the instructions, the assistant then announced

that they would have 15 minutes in which to read the case material
and render a verdict on the last page of the booklet.

Subjects were

asked to turn in their questionnaires when they had completed them.
Each questionnaire was marked with the appropriate subject number, and
subjects were told that the questionnaires were only to be associated
with their subject number and not with their names.
If there were any questions concerning the task, the assistant
attempted to answer them by paraphrasing the written instructions.
Subjects were asked to defer questions concerning the purpose of the
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study and Its hypotheses until after the experiment was completed.
The experimental assistant then remained with the subjects during the
15 minute period.

Those subjects who finished the task before the

15 minutes were up were given a magazine to read until all the sub
jects had finished.
As was mentioned earlier, following the collection of all the
individual verdict questionnaires, those subjects who exceeded the
12 needed to form two six-person juries were randomly selected out,
debriefed in a separate room, and dismissed.

The 12 remaining sub

jects were then randomly divided into two six-person jury groups, with
the constraint that there be three males and three females on each
jury, and placed in separate rooms.
The experimental assistant then read aloud the following instruc
tions :
You are now being asked, as a group, to render an unanimous,
I repeat, unanimous, verdict on the basis of the evidence
presented. As was mentioned earlier, the information you
provide will be used to help formulate policy for dealing
with similar cases, so it is very important that you imagine
yourselves to be in a courtroom situation and assume that you
are all actual members of a jury.
Subjects were then advised to retain their case summary information
and encouraged to consult this information to facilitate decision
making,

The jury groups were instructed by the experimental assis

tant to elect a foreman in whatever fashion they wished.

Subjects

were further instructed to delegate the following responsibilities
to the selected foreman:
the time, and 3)

1)

maintaining order, 2)

keeping track of

reporting the verdict to the experimental assistant
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when it was reached.

After delivering these instructions, the assis

tant announced that they would have 30 minutes to deliberate after
choosing a foreman, and that she would remain in the room to monitor
their progress.

The assistant then retired to one end of the room to

unobtrusively take notes, and did not interfere further in the delib
eration process.
If, at the end of 30 minutes, the jury had not reached an unan
imous verdict, the experimental assistant instructed them to reconvene
and continue deliberating the case for an additional 15 minutes.

If,

at the end of 15 minutes, an unanimous decision still had not been
reached, the experimental assistant would record this.
After the verdict was reported and recorded, the experimental
assistant distributed to the subjects a final questionnaire, concern
ing each subject's perceptions of the victim, the defendant, and the
case in general (see Appendix C).

The pertinent questions, which

follow, were imbedded in four other general questions concerning the
evidence presented:
1)

2)

Please rate the defendant, Mr. Jones, in terms of how much
responsibility you feel he bears for the incident in ques
tion: (circle one)
a)

Completely responsible

b)

Very responsible

c)

Moderately responsible

d)

Slightly responsible

e)

Not at all responsible

Now, please rate Mrs. Jones in terms of how much responsi
bility you feel she bears for the incident in question:
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3)

4)

a)

Completely responsible

b)

Very responsible

c)

Moderately responsible

d)

Slightly responsible

e)

Not at all responsible

How confident would you be of your final verdict, if you
were told that the couple involved in this case, Mr. and
Mrs. Jones, reconciled and began living together again
after the trial? (circle one)
a)

Extremely confident of verdict

b)

Strongly confident of verdict

c)

Moderately confident

d)

Slightly confident

e)

Unsure of verdict

If your final verdict was "guilty", what would your recom
mended sentence (actual time in jail) be?
a)

Maximum sentence of 5 years

b)

Maximum sentence of 2-3 years

c)

Maximum sentence of 1 year

d)

Maximum sentence of 8 months

e)

Maximum sentence of 6 months

f)

Maximum sentence of 2 months

g)

Maximum sentence of 30 days or less

Once again, each questionnaire was marked with the appropriate sub
ject number, and it was emphasized to the subjects that the question
naires were only to be associated with their subject numbers and not
with their names.

Upon completion, the questionnaires were collected;

subjects were then debriefed and told they would be credited with their
participation in the study.
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The Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS)
As was mentioned, a short 25-item version of the SpenceHelmreich (1972) Attitudes toward Women Scale was administered prior
to the present investigation.

Administration of the AWS took place

in a setting unconnected with the jury portion of the study, and at
no time was the AWS said to be related to the jury investigation.
The AWS is composed of 25 statements describing attitudes
toward the role of women in society (e.g., "Swearing and obscenity
are more repulsive in the speech of a woman than of a man").
Subjects are asked to express their opinion about each of these state
ments by indicating whether they 1)
3)

disagree mildly, or 4)

agree strongly, 2)

agree mildly,

disagree strongly with each statement.

Responses are scored on a four point scale, with the most traditional
alternative being scored a 0, and the least traditional alternative
being scored a 3.

Thus, the minimum score which an individual can

receive is 0, while the maximum score possible is 75.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

Individual Verdicts
Subjects were first asked to render an individual verdict after
perusing the case summary information provided.

The percentages of

guilty verdicts given individually by both male and female subjects
in the four experimental conditions are shown in Table

2,

It was found that the inclusion of information in thecase
summary indicating victim provocation produced significantly more
guilty verdicts among the total number of subjects than when such
information was not given

(X*(l) = 4.96, £<;.05).

However, when sub

jects were divided by sex and the verdicts were reanalyzed, it was
found that males were not significantly affected by the addition of
information concerning victim provocation 0C*(1) ~ .46,

.05).

For

female subjects, on the other hand, information suggesting victim pro
vocation yielded significant differences ( X (1) “ 4.12, £ <".05), although
not in the direction predicted.

That is, when the female victim

appeared to have elicited the battering incident by being both ver
bally and physically abusive, female subjects were significantly more
likely to find the defendant guilty than when the victim did nothing
to provoke her attacker.

Verdicts of male subjects, however, were un

affected by the addition of such information concerning the incident.

47

Provocation

Intoxication

No Provocation

II

I

Males

71% (15)

71% (15)

Females

83% (20)

80% (16)

Total

77% (35)

76% (31)

III

IV

Males

70% (14)

52% (12)

Females

87% (20)

50% (11)

Total

79% (34)

51% (23)

No Intoxication

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGES AND NUMBER OF GUILTY VERDICTS
AS A FUNCTION OF VICTIM AND DEFENDANT INFORMATION
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Manipulation of information concerning the intoxication or non
intoxication of the defendant at the time of the battering incident
produced non-significant results for the total number of subjects,
males and females combined, CX\l) = 2.45, £>.05), for males alone
(X*(l) = ,7, £>.05), and for females alone (X.^(l) = 1.36, £ > ,05).
Subjects, then, who were given information indicating the defendant
was intoxicated during the battering incident were no more likely to
find the defendant innocent than were those subjects given "No Intox
ication" information.
Although a statistical analysis of the interaction between the
two variables, victim provocation and defendant intoxication, was not
possible using the

test of significance given the present sample

sizes, the interaction between these variables has been portrayed
graphically in Figure 1,

It can be seen that Conditions I, II, and

III did not differ greatly in terms of the percentages of guilty
verdicts given by both male and female subjects. Condition IV sub
jects (No Provocation-No Intoxication), on the other hand, were much
more likely to find the defendant not guilty than those subjects in
Conditions I, II, and III.

Only 51% of Condition IV subjects voted

guilty as compared with 77%, 76%, and 79%, in Conditions I, II, and
III respectively.

Group Verdicts
After rendering an individual verdict, subjects were divided
into six-person jury groups and asked to render an unanimous group
verdict.

Since nearly half of the 24 group juries were unable to reach
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Figure 1. Percentages of guilty verdicts as a function of
victim provocation and defendant Intoxication.
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an unanimous decision, statistical anlysis of those groups which
did render an unanimous verdict (14 total) was not possible.

However,

the information which was obtained from this portion of the inves
tigation is displayed in Figure 2.

It can be seen that, as with indi

vidual verdicts. Conditions I, II, and III do not differ greatly in
terms of the number of guilty verdicts given by the group juries.
Condition IV juries, however, were somewhat less likely to find the
defendant guilty than juries in Conditions I, II, and III. None of
the juries in Condition IV found the defendant guilty, while three
juries in Condition I, three juries in Condition II, and four juries
in Condition III found the defendant guilty.

Sentencing
Subjects who judged the defendant guilty were also asked for
recommendations regarding sentencing.

A total of 123 guilty verdicts

were returned in the four conditions.

It was found that manipulation

of information concerning victim provocation and defendant intoxica
tion did not significantly influence the severity of sentencing for
male and female subjects combined (Provocation:
Intoxication:

X*(6) = 3.83, _£^>.05).

X^(6) = 12.22,

^

.05;

It was noted, however, that the

difference between Provocation subjects’ verdicts and No Provocation
subjects’ verdicts approached significance (X^6) = 12.22, £<.10), in
the direction originally predicted.

Thus, while defendant intoxication

had no effect on subjects’ sentencing recommendations, subjects who
received information suggesting victim provocation tended to recommend
more lenient sentences for the defendant than subjects who did not
receive such information.
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Figure 2.

Group verdicts rendered by subjects in each experimental condition.
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Perceptions of Responsibility
Subjects who participated in the group deliberation portion of
this investigation were also questioned as to their perceptions of the
amount of responsibility borne by both the defendant and victim for
the incident in question.

It was found that the defendant who was pro

voked was not seen to be any less responsible for the battering inci
dent than the defendant who was not provoked

OCW

= 3.64, £^,05).

Likewise, the provocative victim was not perceived as being any more

~

responsible for the incident than the non-provocative victim
4,06, £^.05).

In general, subjects perceived the defendant as being

significantly more responsible than his victim for the incident, whether
he had been provoked (')(^(4) = 20,02,

2.<;005)

or not (^(4) = 32.22,

2 <. 005).
In terms of alcohol intoxication, the defendant who was intoxi
cated at the time the battering took place was not seen to be any less
responsible for the incident than the defendant who was not intoxicated
at the time of the battering (X^(4) = 2.76, 2>.05).

In general, as

above, subjects perceived the defendant as being significantly more
responsible than the victim for the incident, whether he was intoxicated
OC'(4) = 31.94, £<.005) or not CX\4) = 15.89, £<.005).

Attitudes Toward Women
The median score for the 301 subjects who completed the Attitudes
toward Women Scale (AWS) was found to fall between 53 and 54.

Based

on their score on the AWS, then, all subjects were designated as being
either "Traditional" in their attitudes toward the role of women in
society (scores^53) or "Non-traditional" (scores=^54).
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For those conditions where subjects received information indicating
victim provocation (Conditions I and III), the effect of the individual
subject's attitudes toward women on his or her individual verdict was
tested.

It was found that differences in AWS scores had no signifi

cant effect on the total number of subjects' verdicts (^*(1) = .05, _£>.05),
nor on male subjects alone (X^(l) = .00009,
alone (X\l) = .03, £>- .05).

.05), or female subjects

Thus, subjects having traditional atti

tudes toward the role of women in society were no more likely to find
the defendant innocent when his wife provoked the incident than those
subjects having more non-traditional attitudes toward women.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

One of the primary purposes of the present investigation was to
determine whether information indicating victim provocation in a case
of marital violence would influence the decisions of simulated jurors.
It was found that the manipulation of such information did in fact
affect jurors' verdicts, but not in the manner predicted.

Jurors

who received victim provocation information were much more likely to
find the defendant guilty than those jurors who did not receive such
information.

This was contrary to what was originally postulated, as

it had been expected that such victim information would produce a
greater tendency to perceive the defendant as not guilty. However, it
is interesting to note that when subjects* verdicts were divided accord
ing to the sex of the subject, it became apparent that, actually,
female jurors were most significantly affected by the addition of the vic
tim provocation information, while male jurors were relatively uninflu
enced by it.

Although one may only speculate as to why this was the

case, it is quite possible that when female jurors received the infor
mation concerning the female victim’s provocative response to her hus
band (calling him names, slapping him), this may have caused them to
identify with the victim.

If this was the case, it may be that female

jurors imagined that the victim's verbal abuse of her husband was
justified, i.e., that he was, in fact, the "lousy bum" she had labeled
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hlm.

This Identification process, then, may have increased the ten

dency for female jurors
caused them to

to react

negativelyto the defendant and thus

find him guilty of the crime of assault more often.

It was also predicted that information concerning victim pro
vocation would produce more lenient sentences when jurors found the
defendant guilty.

Although the evidence supporting this prediction

was not exceedingly strong, the tendency for jurors receiving victim
provocation information to give more lenient sentences to the defen
dant was there nonetheless.

Although it might seem to, this finding

does not actually conflict with the identification process already
suggested.

It

is quite possible

were likely toidentify with the

that even though Provoked subjects

victim and thus find the defendant

guilty, they might also have felt, at the same time, that the defen
dant was "less guilty" if he had been provoked.

Thus, recommendations

for sentencing were less severe in the "Provoked" conditions than in
the "Non-provoked"conditions.
Another concern of the current study was the effect information
concerning the intoxication or non-intoxication of the defendant
would have on jurors' perceptions of guilt.

It had been hypothesized

that jurors would tend to view a defendant who was drinking at the
time of the battering incident as less responsible for his actions, and
thus, find him guilty less often.

It had also been predicted that

jurors who found the defendant guilty would recommend more lenient
sentences, for the same reasons as above, if the defendant was intox
icated.
dictions.

However, the findings of this study did not support these pre
Subjects who were told the defendant was intoxicated were
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no more likely to find the defendant innocent than were subjects who
were told the defendant was not intoxicated.
was also unaffected by such information.

Severity of sentencing

However, since the infor

mation concerning the defendant’s intoxication consisted of only two
sentences in the context of a lengthy, 5-page case summary, it is
possible that the impact of this information was reduced somewhat in
light of the total amount of information which subjects received.
Clearly, more research is necessary in this area in order to assess
the impact of this variable on jurors’ decisions.

Future investiga

tions might give the information concerning the intoxication of the
defendant more prominence in the total summary of the case information
as a means of more realistically doing this.

Additionally, the inclu

sion of a test of individual subjects’ recall for the important details
of the case, such as alcohol involvement, might provide additional
feedback concerning the impact of such information on jurors.
An additional concern of this study was the effect of victim
provocation and defendant intoxication on jurors’ perceptions
responsibility.

In line with the hypotheses made concerning percep

tions of guilt, it was expected that subjects who received pro
vocation information would tend to perceive the relative responsi
bility of the victim and defendant differently.
not found to be the case.

However, this was

Essentially, subjects saw the defendant

as being primarily responsible for the battering incident, whether
provocation occurred or not.

Similarly, it was also expected that

jurors who were given information indicating defendant intoxication
would perceive the defendant's responsibility for the crime somewhat
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differently.

However, as before, subjects saw the defendant as

being more responsible for the battering incident than the victim,
regardless of his state of intoxication.
Another aim of the present investigation was to examine the
relationship between jurors’ perception of guilt and general views
of the role of women in society.

In this context, it had been pos

tulated that individual jurors with traditional views of women,
when presented with evidence that the female victim may have acted
aggressively prior to the battering incident, would be less likely
to find the defendant guilty than jurors with non-traditional views.
Again^ this prediction was not borne out by the findings of this
study.

However, since this prediction was based on research which

suggested that aggressive behavior directed toward women was disap
proved of less by traditionalistic individuals when feminine sex role
expectations were violated, it is possible that in this particular
case, the female victim was not seen as being overly aggressive or as
violating social expectations.

In other words, perhaps the victim

portrayed in the "Provoked" conditions was not perceived by the jurors
as being all that provocative or as intolerably abusive.

If such

was the case, traditional jurors’ social expectations would not have
been violated sufficiently to produce the reactions seen by other
researchers, such as Young, ^

al. (1975) and Kaleta and Buss (Note 3).

Additionally, this possibility could also be seen as providing some
support for the speculation that female jurors may have identified
with the victim.

It is unlikely that they would have, had she been

perceived as being too "shrewish" or extremely unfeminine.

Pilot-work
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geared toward assessing what Is actually considered "provocative"
female behavior by most people should certainly be completed before
research In a similar vein Is attempted.
It Is Interesting to note that In Condition IV, that Is, the
condition In which case summary Information Indicated defendant
Intoxication and made no mention of victim provocation, jurors, both
Individually and In groups, were more likely to find the defendant
not guilty than those jurors In Conditions I, II, and III.

These

findings were rather unexpected In terms of the original hypotheses,
and one can only speculate as to why jurors should react differently
In this condition.

Apparently, jurors were Interpreting this Infor

mation In a special fashion which led to fewer guilty verdicts, although
anecdotal Information obtained from the jurors contains no clues as
to how this was occurring.

Certainly, Isolation of the factors Impor

tant here requires further Investigation.
In view of both the sociological and experimental findings con
cerning attitudes toward female victims of violence, the general
results of this study. I.e., the overall percentages of guilty verdicts
for the four conditions (see Table 2), provide substantial food for
thought.

The social psychological literature, particularly In the area

of victim devaluation, suggests that most people have a tendency to
blame the Innocent victim of violence for his or her misfortune.

Like

wise, the sociological literature also suggests that many Individuals
tend to feel that battered women may "deserve" what they get.

In this

particular case, then, one malght have expected that jurors* reactions
to the defendant would be more positive, resulting In a fairly large
percentage of not guilty verdicts.

However, Interestingly enough. In
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all four conditions of the study, at least half of the jurors found
the defendant guilty.

In three out of the four conditions, the

average percentage of guilty verdicts was 77%.

Such percentages seem

surprisingly high, and suggest a greater sensitivity than was ex
pected to the problem of marital violence and to the problem of
attributing responsibility in such cases.

However, since it seems

likely that the simulated jurors in this particular study did not
perceive the victim as being particularly provocative, it would be
interesting to assess the effects of portraying the victim as more
provocative and abusive.

As has been mentioned, exactly what is

considered by most people to be "provocative" female behavior needs
to be assessed by further pilot-work.
It should also be noted that the anecdotal information provided
by the experimental assistants present during the group deliberations
sheds some light on the reasoning process which apparently went on in
those groups which found the defendant not guilty.

Not surprisingly,

the fact that there were no witnesses of the battering incident
figured prominently in some jurors’ decisions to find the defendant
not guilty, particularly since the "Instructions To The Jurors" inclu
ded a passage which stated that the juror must decide whether he was
convinced of the defendant’s guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt".

Many

jurors reportedly interpreted the instruction, "beyond a reasonable
doubt", as meaning they must have absolutely "no doubt" as to the guilt
of the defendant, if they were to find him guilty.

The intentionality

of the defendant was another factor which was given much consideration by
groups which found the defendant not guilty.

Whether the defendant was
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intoxicated or not, jurors frequently speculated that the defendant
probably had not "meant" to hit his wife, and therefore, was not
guilty.

One juror, for example, even supported this view by stating

that even though he had hit his girl-friend on occasion, he had never
done so intentionally— it had just "happened".

Finally, two groups

finding the defendant not guilty apparently did so because informa
tion concerning the victim's and defendant's respective height and
weight was not available to them.

They felt that a sufficiently

large woman could conceivably threaten a small man, such that he
would be required to strike her in self-defense.

Because this infor

mation was not included in the case summary, jurors again noted they
could not find the defendant guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt".

As

the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction seems to have played an
important role in the decision-making process of the jurors of this
study, it would seem that further investigation of the impact of this
instruction on jury decision-making is necessary.

The interpreta

tion of the "reasonable doubt" clause by individual jurors in this
study was apparently quite variable, and it would be interesting to
examine exactly how jurors tend to interpret this instruction.
The present study does have some important limitations which
should be discussed.

First, the experiment was a simulation of actual

courtroom procedures.

Students were used as jurors; they read only

a summary of a case, and knew their verdicts had no real consequences
for the defendant.

Problems in generalizing from laboratory experi

ments to the actual courtroom situation have been discussed at length
by Gerbasi, e_t

(1977).

Nevertheless, such experiments are at least
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a starting point.

Second, some problems did arise when the group

juries were asked to render an unanimous verdict.

Almost half of

these group juries were unable to do this in the time allotted; it
is difficult to predict whether a lengthier deliberation period would
have alleviated this problem.

Experimental assistants noted that

jurors tended to become emotionally invested in their particular posi
tion and often clung tenaciously to their verdict even if it meant a
"hung" jury.

It seems unlikely, then, that a longer deliberation

period would have affected those jurors whose viewpoints had "crystal
lized" to the point where they were unable to change their verdicts.
Although group juries clearly improve the quality of analogue jury
research, duplicating actual courtroom procedure in terms of actual
deliberation time is somewhat problematic for researchers in this area.
Kerr, et al. (1975), encountering a similar problem, suggested that
one answer may be to replace the unanimous decision rule with a major
ity decision rule.

Certainly, attempts should be made to continue

implementing group deliberation as a part of analogue jury research.
As has been mentioned already, the present investigation's find
ings suggest a number of possibilities for future research.

Clearly,

assessment of the impact of a victim who is portrayed as more intolerable
and clearly violating sex role expectations might be appropriate.
Also, examination of the effect of defendant intoxication might be
more realistically carried out by giving such defendant information
more prominence within the total case summary information which jurors
receive.

It seems quite possible that, in this study, the sheer amount
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of information which jurors received may have diverted attention from
the variables under study.

Future investigations might attempt to ex

amine the effects of the same variables, but in the context of less
total information.
Finally, several other possibilities for research in areas which
are somewhat peripheral to the research questions which were origi
nally posed have already been noted in the course of the discussion.
It would be interesting, first of all, to examine more closely exactly
how jurors interpret the "reasonable doubt" instruction, within the con
text of certain types of cases.

If the anecdotal information gained

from this study is at all accurate, individual jurors vary a great deal
in their standards of reasonable doubt.

Additionally, it would be

intersting to note whether jurors in marital assault cases tend to
interpret the "reasonable doubt" clause in a different manner from
jurors in non-marital assault cases.

Second, as some jurors were evi

dently disturbed by the fact that there were no witnesses to the alleged
assault, the impact of witness testimony in marital assault cases on
jurors’ perceptions of guilt might be assessed by further investigation.
Again, it might be worthwhile to assess whether jurors in conjugal
assault cases tend to feel the testimony of witnesses is more important
than jurors in assault cases involving two unrelated parties.

As it is

often the case that there are no witnesses in marital assault cases,
the importance of this factor seems to be an area worthy of further
inquiry.

Last, as several jurors seemed concerned about the relative

sizes of the assaulter and his victim, and implicitly, about their
relative ability to threaten harm to each other, the effect of such
information on jurors’ perception of guilt might also be examined in
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future studies.

Certainly, a great deal of work still needs to be

done in order to assess the importance of the variables in question,
victim provocation and defendant intoxication, to Jury decision
making.

Hopefully the findings of the current investigation have

clarified, to some extent, the problems which may be encountered in
such research, and provided some impetus for future study in the
area.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY

The general intent of the present investigation was to examine
the effect a hypothetical wife-battering case would have on mock
jurors* perceptions of a defendant's guilt.

More specifically, the

purpose of the study was to (a) assess the impact of manipulating
two situational variables in the case, namely victim provocation and
intoxication of the assaulter, on jurors* verdicts and sentencing
recommendations, and (b) examine the relationship between perception
of guilt and general views of the role of women in society, as assessed
by a short version of the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS).
174 subjects (85 males, 89 females) who had previously completed
the AWS were selected from University of Montana introductory and
developmental psychology classes and randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions.

All subjects received a court case summary

involving charges stemming from an alleged incident in which a woman
was beaten by her husband.

However, half of the subjects received

information in the summary which indicated that the victim had been
verbally and physically abusive to her husband prior to the beating
(Provocation), while the other subjects received information which indi
cated that the victim did nothing to provoke the battering incident
(No Provocation).

Similarly, case summaries either indicated that the

husband (defendant) was intoxicated at the time the battering took
place, or that he was sober.

The four experimental conditions, then,
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included:

(1) Provocation-Intoxication, (2) No Provocation-Intoxi

cation, (3) Provocation-No Intoxication, and (4) No Provocation-No
Intoxication.

After perusing the court case summary, subjects were

first asked to render an individual verdict; if they found the defen
dant guilty they were also asked to make sentencing recommendations.
After rendering an individual verdict, subjects were divided into sixperson jury groups and asked to deliberate until they were able to
reach an unanimous group verdict.

Finally, subjects were asked to

complete a brief questionnaire concerning their perceptions of the
victim, the defendant, and the case in general.
The results of the present study revealed that (a) when the
female victim appeared to have elicited the battering incident by
being both verbally and physically abusive, female subjects were sig
nificantly more likely to find the defendant guilty than when the vic
tim did not provoke her attacker, (b) subjects who were given informa
tion indicating the defendant was intoxicated during the battering
incident were no more likely to find the defendant innocent than were
those subjects give "No Intoxication" information, and (c) subjects
with more traditionalistic attitudes toward the role of women in society
were no more likely to find the defendant not guilty when his wife
provoked the incident than those subjects with more non-traditional
attitudes toward women.

Additionally, although defendant intoxication

information had no effect on subjects' sentencing recommendation,
subjects who received information suggesting victim provocation tended
to recommend more lenient sentences for the defendant than those sub
jects who did not receive such information.

66
Possible interpretations of the current results and implications
for future research were discussed.

Also, pertinent anecdotal informa

tion gained from the study was detailed.

Additional comments were

directed toward the limitations of the present investigation, and sugges
tions were made as to how these might be alleviated in future analogue
jury studies.
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APPENDIX A
Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS)

The statements listed below describe attitudes toward the role of
women in society that different people have.
wrong answers, only opinions.

There are no right or

You are asked to express your feeling

about each statement by indicating whether you (A) agree strongly,
(B) agree mildly, (C) disagree mildly, or (D) disagree strongly.
Please indicate your opinion by blackening either A, B, C, or D on
the anxwer sheet provided.
1,

Swearing and obscenity are more repulsive in the speech of a
woman than of a man.

2,

Women should take increasingresponsibility for leadership
solving the intellectual and social problems of the day,

3,

Both husband and wife should be allowed the same grounds for
divorce,

4,

Telling dirty jokes should be mostly a masculine prerogative.

5,

Intoxicationamong women is worse than

6,

Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside
the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing
dishes and doing laundry,

7,

It is insulting to women to have the "obey" clause remain in the
marriage service,

8,

There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and pro
motion without regard to sex.

9,

in

intoxication among men.

A woman should be as free as a man to propose marriage.

10, Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming
good wives and mothers.
11, Women earning as much as their dates should bear equally the expense
when they go out together.
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12. Women should assume their rightful place In business and all the
professions along with men.
13. A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places or to
have quite the same freedom of action as a man.
14. Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to
college than daughters,
15. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive and for a man
to d a m socks.
16. In general, the father should have greater authority than the
mother in the bringing up of children.
17. Women should be encouraged not to become sexually Intimate with
anyone before marriage, even their fiances.
18. The husband should not be favored by law over the wife in the disposal
of family property or income.
19. Women should be concerned with their duties of childbearing and
house tending, rather than with desires for professional and
business careers.
20. The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in the
hands of men.
21. Economic and social freedom is worth far more to women than
acceptance of the ideal of femininity which has been set up by men.
22. On the average, women should be regarded as less capable of contrib
uting to economic production than are men.
23. There are many jobs in which men should be given preference over
women in being hired or promoted.
24. Women should be given equal opportunity with men for apprenticeship
in the various trades.
25. The modern girl is entitled to the same freedom from regulation
and control that is given to the modern boy.
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APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENTAL BOOKLET

I.

General Instructions;
Please read the following description of an incident and the
court proceedings which resulted. You are asked to render a verdict
on the basis of the evidence presented. This description includes
the main points from an actual trial. The information you provide
will be used to help formulate policy for dealing with similar cases,
so it is very important that you imagine yourself to be in a court
room situation and assume that you are an actual member of the
jury, PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THE PARTICULARS OF THIS CASE OR YOUR
VERDICT WITH THE OTHER PEOPLE PRESENT UNTIL YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO
DO SO.
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II.

The Incident;
On the evening of July 18, 1978, Mrs. Carole Jones
(age 31) states that she was assaulted by her husband, William
Jones (age 32), in the kitchen of their home. According to Mrs.
Jones, her husband arrived home at approximately 10:30 PM.
(Intoxication Condition: Mrs. Jones states he appeared to be very
drunk at the time.) (No Intoxication Condition: Mrs. Jones
states he did not appear to have been drinking before coming
home.) When Mrs. Jones asked her husband where he had been
that evening, she says he became very angry, shouted at her,
and began kicking the kitchen furniture. (Provocation Condi
tion; At that point, Mrs. Jones says she became very angry and
began shouting back at him and calling him names, including
"lousy bum" and "stupid bastard". Then, when Mr. Jones
began kicking the furniture, Mrs. Jones states that she slapped
him on the arm once and told him to "cut it out".) She asserts
that then Mr. Jones struck her on the left side of the head.
When it began to "look like trouble", Mrs, Jones says she moved
towards the phone with the intent to summon help. Mrs. Jones
states her husband then attempted to take the phone away from
her at that point and struck her several more times on the
head and face with the phone receiver, until she broke away
from him and ran to the neighbors' home next door.
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III.

The Prosecution*s Case;
1)

Theprosecution first called Mr. Tom Steck, neighbor of
Mr. and Mrs. Jones to testify. According to Mr. Steck, on
the evening of July 18, 1978, he and his wife heard a knock
at the front door and answered it. They found Mrs. Jones
without her glasses and with blood on her face and clothes.
Mrs. Steck then called 911, the emergency number. Looking out
the window, Mr. Steck saw Nr. Jones get into his car and
leave. Mr. Steck said he then went with Mrs. Jones to her house
and waited in the driveway for the police.

2)

The
prosecution then submitted
the report of
theinvestiga
ting officer, James Hailey. According to Hailey, when he
arrived at the scene, Mr. Jones had left and Mrs. Jones was
in the house bleeding moderately from the nose. He stated it
looked as though her nose could be broken. There was also
a large bruise on her left temple, and her left eye was very
swollen. There was blood on Mrs. Jones* shirt, and on the
floor of the kitchen. When asked, Mrs. Jones said that
she wished to sign a complaint, and Officer Hailey took a
written statement from her about the incident.

3)

Hospital records submitted by the prosecution showed that
upon admittance to the emergency room, Mrs. Jones stated that
she had been beaten up by her husband. Her nose was bleeding
and her left eye was swollen shut. Subsequent examination
revealed a broken nose and hemorrhaging left eye.

4)

In its closing argument, the prosecution stated that it had
proven its case by presenting the charges made by Mrs. Jones,
the testimony of her neighbor and the investigating officer,
and by submitting hospital records which detailed the extent
of Mrs. Jones' injuries. In addition, the prosecution noted
that it was very unlikely their client concocted the beating
story so quickly and in so much detail under the circumstances
described.
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IV.

The Defense's Case:

1)

The defense first called Mr, Jones to testify in his own behalf.
Mr. Jones stated that he had not been angry about being asked by
his wife, Carole, where he had been on the evening of July 18,
1978, and denied shouting at her and "kicking furniture around".
Instead, he stated that his wife was extremely upset with him for
coming home at such a late hour {Provocation Condition: and
began being both verbally and physically abusive of him.) He
asserted that she then grabbed the telephone receiver and came
at him, as if she was going to strike him with it.

2)

According to Mr. Jones, he then struggled with his wife in an
effort to get the phone out of her hands, so as to protect
himself. He admitted that it was possible that his wife may have
received blows to the head at that time, but he denied that he
ever intentionally struck his wife or intended to harm her in
any way. (Intoxication Condition: He admitted he had been drink
ing heavily before coming home.) (No Intoxication Condition:
He stated that he had not been drinking before coming home.)
He further stated that he had no idea she was hurt badly at the
time, and so left the scene in order to allow his wife to "cool
off".

3)

Next, the defense called Dr. H.R. Brown, a local physician,
to the stand. According to Dr. Brown, there was nothing in the
hospital records submitted by the prosecution which would indicate
that Mrs. Jones' injuries were intentionally caused. He
clarified this statement by saying that the hospital records did
not prove, one way or the other, whether or not the injuries
were accidentally or intentionally caused.

4)

In its closing argument, the defense attested that their client
acted in self-defense during the incident in question, and in no
way intended to harm his wife. Any blows received by Mrs. Jones,
the defense further stated, were entirely accidental. In addition,
the defense felt that the hospital records submitted by the
prosecution did not rule out the possibility that the pattern
of injuries received by Mrs. Jones could have been accidentally
caused.

80
or another, or to prevent the commision of a forcible felony.
After weighing these points, you must decide whether the evidence
has convinced you of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

If any such doubt causes a feeling of hesitation and dis

satisfaction in your mind which will not permit you to rest on a
verdict of guilty by the evidence, then, by law, you are to find the
defendant not guilty.
The law forbids you to be governed by sentiment, sympathy,
passion, prejudice or public opinion.

Both the State and the defen

dant have the right to expect that you will faithfully and fairly
consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and
that you will reach a just verdict, without considering what the
consequences or sentence will be.

GIVEN:
E, P. Haskell
District Court Judge
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VI.

Individual Verdict Questionnaire;

1)

Now we would like you to Indicate your verdict. Please
feel free to review all Instructions and Information.
As a juror, I find the defendant:
a)
b)

2)

guilty
not guilty

If you voted "guilty" above, what would your recommended
sentence (actual time In jail) be?
a)

Maximum sentence of 5 years

b)

Maximum sentence of 2-3 years

c)

Maximum sentence of 1 year

d)

Maximum sentence of 8 months

e)

Maximum sentence of 6 months

f)

Maximum sentence of 2 months

g)
3)

(circle one)

Maximum sentence of 30 days or less

How confident are you of your verdict? (circle one)
a)

Extremely confident of verdict

b)

Strongly confident of verdict

c)

Moderately confident

d)

Slightly confident

e)

Unsure of verdict
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APPENDIX C
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE

1)

How important do you feel the testimony of the investigating officer
in this case (Officer Hailey) was in helping you to render your final
verdict? (circle one)
a) extremely important
b) very important
c) moderately important
d) slightly important
e) not important at all

2)

Please rate the defendant, Mr, Jones, in terms of how much responsi
bility you feel he bears for the incident in question:
a) completely responsible
b) very responsible
c) moderately responsible
d) slightly responsible
e) not at all responsible

3)

Now, please rate Mrs. Jones in terms of how much responsibility you
feel she bears for the incident in question:
a) completely responsible
b) very responsible
c) moderately responsible
d) slightly responsible
e) not at all responsible

4)

How important do you feel the testimony of the physician. Dr. Brown,
was in helping you to render your final verdict?
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a) extremely important
b) very Important
c) moderately important
d) slightly important
e) not important at all
5)

How confident would you be of your final verdict, if you were told
that the couple involved in this case, Mr. and Mrs, Jones, recon
ciled and began living together again after the trial?
a) extremely confident of verdict
b) very confident of verdict
c) moderately confident
d) slightly confident
e) unsure of verdict

6)

How important do you feel the testimony of the Jones' neighbor,
Mr. Steck, was in helping you to render your final verdict?
a) extremely important
b) very important
c) moderately important
d) slightly important
e) not important at all

7) Whose testimony was most important in helping you to render your
final verdict? (circle one)
a) Mrs, Jones'
b) Mr, Jones'
c) Mr, Steck's
d) Officer Hailey's
e) Dr. Brown's
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time in jail) be?
a)

Maximum sentence of 5 years

b)

Maximum sentence of 2-3 years

c)

Maximum sentence of 1 year

d)

Maximum sentence of 8 months

e)

Maximum sentence of 6 months

f)

Maximum sentence of 2 months

g)

Maximum sentence of 30 days or less

